



BORNA POŠTA  SINIŠA ŠADEK             
borna.posta@fer.hr sinisa.sadek@fer.hr 





MATHEMATICAL MODEL OF THE NPP KRŠKO PCFV SYSTEM FOR 





Containment building is the final barrier for radioactive releases from a 
nuclear power plant (NPP). Preserving its integrity will minimize these releases 
even in a case of a severe accident with core degradation and melt discharge in the 
containment accompanied with the pressure and temperature increase. Installation 
of a venting system with ability to filter radioactive fission products is a preferred 
way to deal with the issue in present and future NPPs, especially after the 
Fukushima accident. Such system, called passive containment filtered venting 
system (PCFV), was installed in 2013 in the NPP Krško. Thermal hydraulic model 
of the PCFV system which included aerosol and iodine filters, associated pipings 
and valves was developed for the best-estimate computer code RELAP5. Main 
results and discussion are presented and compared with relevant plant 
documentation. 
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Upgrades of existing safety systems and installation of new systems are the 
most important actions in strengthening safety of nuclear installations and their 
ability to withstand accident conditions. Containment building represents the last 
physical barrier in the defence in depth concept for a nuclear power plant (NPP) 
because it prevents radioactive releases to the environment. Pressure increase 
caused by decay heat losses in the containment atmosphere and supported by the 
accumulation of incondensable gases produced during the molten corium concrete 
interaction may challenge the integrity of the containment wall. A containment 
filtered venting system based on the dry filter method (DFM) enables the plant to 
effectively mitigate the consequences of a severe accident by reducing the pressure 
and the level of fission products releases to the environment during the venting 
process. This system provides high decontamination factors for aerosols such as 
caesium iodide and caesium hydroxide and for both elemental and organic iodine. 
The system can operate in a fully passive manner and does not require other 
support functions like cooling or electricity and is therefore named as passive 
containment filtered venting (PCFV) system. 
Following the lessons learned from the accident at the nuclear power plant 
Fukushima in Japan and according to the Slovenian Nuclear Safety Administration 
(SNSA) Decree No.: 3570-11/2011/7 on September 1, 2011 [1], the NPP Krško (NEK) 
decided to take the necessary steps for upgrade of safety measures to prevent severe 
accidents and to improve the means to successfully mitigate their consequences. 
Consequently, one of the first modifications that NEK implemented during the 
outage 2013 is the installation of the PCFV system. The system is based on the dry 
filter method and designed to be used in case of severe accident conditions involving 
core relocation from the pressure vessel. The resulting pressurizing gas-vapour 
mixture in the containment can be discharged through the PCFV to the 
environment. This pressure relief is used to prevent the failure of the containment 
as a result of slow containment pressurization to levels above the containment 
vessel design pressure. The filter system protects the environment and surrounding 
population from airborne radioactive aerosols containing caesium which can enter 
the food chain and gaseous radioactive iodine and its organic compounds which can 
accumulate in the human thyroid. 
The system operation was simulated using the system code RELAP5. 
RELAP5 is a state-of-the-art thermal hydraulic code which has a broad verification 
basis and is able to simulate the complete venting process for the whole range of 
design conditions and the different operation modes. An explicit model was 
developed based on NEK isometric drawings [2] and component design data. Since 
the system is needed for beyond design basis accident situations, the verification 
analysis is based on best-estimate assumptions. The steady state calculation was 
performed to verify the nodalization by comparing the results with the design 
operating parameters (pressure, temperature, gas velocity). The transient 
calculation, in the absence of the measured data, was run with the boundary 
conditions extracted from the calculations performed with the code MELCOR in 





scope of the supporting calculations for the plant reported in relevant documents [3] 
and papers [4], [5]. The knowledge gained in this analysis will be later used to 
develop a model for the integral plant simulation with explicit models of all power 
plant systems, including the model of the PCFV system. 
 
 
2. PCFV SYSTEM DESCRIPTION AND MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
 
2.1 PCFV system outline 
 
The passive containment filtered venting system, a system specially designed 
for light water reactor NPPs to work without external power supply, is used to filter 
radioactive aerosols, gaseous iodine, iodine organic compounds and to control the 
containment pressure. 
The PCFV system consists of aerosol filters, the iodine filter, the rupture disc, 
valves, expansion orifices, instrumentation and associated piping, Figure 1. The 
venting gas first passes aerosol filter modules, leaves the containment via piping 
through a containment penetration, passes the iodine filter and discharges to the 




Figure 1. PCFV system layout, taken from [6] 
 





Aerosol filters (five units on the right hand side in Figure 1) remove solid 
particles and aerosols from the vented gases by mechanical filtering using a metal 
fiber filter. They are connected with piping, which leads the vent stream out of the 
containment through the containment penetration and then splits into a passive 
and an active actuation line. The passive actuation of the system will occur once the 
containment pressure exceeds the rupture disk burst pressure of 0.6 MPa. The 
vented gases will then flow through two normally-opened isolation valves and the 
pressure relief valve. The pressure relief valve isolates the passive actuation line at 
low containment pressure in order to prevent too low pressure conditions inside the 
containment. The valve maintains the pressure inside the containment between 
0.41 MPa and 0.49 MPa. The active actuation of the system can be achieved 
through the opening of the two normally closed isolation valves, either manually 
with the remote handwheels or from a control room with motor actuators. In the 
analysis, only the passive line with the rupture disc and the relief valve was 
simulated. 
Before entering the iodine filter, gases flow through an orifice which controls 
the mass flow and maximum humidity of the vented gas stream. In the filter beds, 
the gaseous radioactive iodine and its organic compounds are removed through 
chemical sorption with silver as an active material with the designed filter 
efficiency. 
In addition, nitrogen is used for long term storage and inerting of the zeolite 
filter material of the iodine filter. Also, injection of nitrogen prevents too low 
pressure conditions due to steam condensation when venting is stopped and the 
system cools down. Nitrogen is provided by a separate nitrogen supply system 
connected to system piping downstream of the actuation lines. 
 
2.2 RELAP5 model and nodalization 
 
The code version used in the calculation was RELAP5/MOD3.3 [7]. The 
nodalization scheme of the PCFV system is shown in Figure 2. All major 
components which are required for the filtered venting functions of the PCFV have 
been considered and were implemented in the model. The model consists of 160 
control volumes, 159 junctions and 154 heat structures with 924 mesh points. A 
PCFV system sketch with piping dimensions is shown in Figure 3 and its RELAP5 
representation with the main control volume (CV) data is presented in Table I. 
 






























































































































































































Table I. Description of RELAP5 control volumes 
 
Control 
volume Segments Length [m] Flow area [m
2] Hydraulic diameter [m] Vertical angle 
111 14 61.46 650 14.4 90° 
AF1-10 4 2.42 2.2149 1.484 90° 
AF2-20 4 2.42 2.2149 1.484 90° 
AF3-30 4 2.42 2.2149 1.484 90° 
AF4-14 4 2.42 1.5356 1.2 90° 
AF5-15 4 2.42 2.2149 1.484 90° 
12 1 0.552 0.032 0.2032 90° 
22 1 0.552 0.032 0.2032 90° 
32 1 0.402 0.01824 0.1524 90° 
40 10 5.242 0.01824 0.1524 0° 
43 7 3.586 0.032 0.2032 0° 
50 4 2.957 0.05 0.254 0° 
53 10 6.873 0.05 0.254 –90° 
62 1 0.659 0.032 0.2032 90° 
63 1 0.654 0.032 0.2032 90° 
60 1 0.655 0.032 0.2032 0° 
61 10 6.131 0.01824 0.1524 0° 
54 13 9.3 0.032 0.2032 0°/90° 
70 10 6.754 0.05 0.254 0° 
71 6 3.711 0.05 0.254 90° 
72 5 2.912 0.05 0.254 0° 
73 5 3.287 0.1 0.356 90° 
IF-80 4 1.6 19.5 0.27 0° 
90 7 5.091 0.29 0.6096 90° 
91 7 3.06 0.29 0.6096 0° 
92 30 32.599 0.29 0.6096 90° 
 
Control volumes 10, 20, 30, 14 and 15 represent aerosol filters 1-5, 
respectively. The iodine filter is modelled with CV 80. Filters’ flow areas, hydraulic 
diameters and friction factors were adapted to obtain correct steady state gas 
velocities. All other control volumes represent PCFV piping. Pressure loss 
coefficients have been modelled to account for elbows and branches. Wall roughness 
is set generally to 10-6 m. The volumes are nodalized in such way that the node 
length is approximately 0.5 m to accurately track the gas composition as well as to 
support computation of pressure wave loads. The general Courant rule that the 
minimal time step applied corresponds with flow velocity and the length of the 
nodes has been respected. 
The rupture disc is modelled as a trip valve component 76 which opens when 
the containment pressure reaches 0.6 MPa. The relief valve (component 77) is also 
modelled as a trip valve but with pressure hysteresis behaviour. The valve needs to 





keep the pressure inside the containment between 0.41 MPa, closing pressure, and 
0.49 MPa, opening pressure, after the failure of the rupture disc. Thus, valve 
operation is characterized by two setpoint pressures: an opening pressure and a 
“reseat” (closing) pressure. As system pressure is increased, the valve opens at the 
opening pressure and remains open until the system pressure falls below the reseat 
pressure. This process therefore involves hysteresis; operation of the valve is not 
only dependent on the pressure but also on whether the valve is currently open or 
closed. This behaviour was modelled by a simple script: 
 
20605020 p 111010000 gt null 0 4.1e5 n
20605030 p 111010000 gt null 0 4.9e5 n
20610010 502 and 1002 n
20610020 503 or  1001 n
 
First, variable trips 502 and 503 are defined to compare the current system 
pressure against the two setpoint pressures. Control volume 111 represents 
containment and 'p' stands for pressure. Next, logical trips 1001 and 1002 are used 
to combine the information from the variable trips with the information on the 
current valve status into a trip that will control the valve. Trip 1001 is true only if 
the valve was open on the previous time step and the current pressure is above the 
closing setpoint pressure. Trip 1002 is true only if the pressure exceeds the opening 
setpoint pressure or the valve was open on the previous time step and the current 
pressure is above the closing setpoint pressure. Therefore, the status of trip 1002 is 
used to control the model valve position: opened when the trip is true and closed 
when the trip is false. 
The orifice at the inlet in the iodine filter used to control operating conditions 
in the filter is modelled as a single junction component with an abrupt area change 
option. 
The heat losses to the environment through the pipe walls, aerosol and iodine 
filter internal and housing structures were modelled as heat structures. The 
conduction through these structures was assumed to be one-dimensional and a 
stainless steel heat conductivity and volumetric heat capacity data were used. Heat 
convection from the hot gases to the walls was calculated internally by the code and 
for the heat transfer to the environment three sets of data were used, according to 
[8], depending on the outside conditions: 
• containment atmosphere: heat transfer coefficient (HTC) 20 W/m2K, 
temperature 443 K, 
• auxiliary building atmosphere: HTC 10 W/m2K, temperature 353 K, 
• outside air: HTC 20 W/m2K, temperature 318 K. 
 
 





3. ANALYSIS RESULTS 
 
3.1 Steady state calculation 
 
The input model was verified by checking its output results and comparing 
them with design parameters reported in [8]. Boundary conditions for the steady 
state were modelled using the time-dependent volume 151 and time-dependent 
junction 152 components. The working fluid was pure steam, as specified in the 
afore-mentioned document, at pressure 0.6 MPa and temperature 443 K with a 
mass flow rate 7 kg/s. The outlet conditions were set to atmospheric pressure 
101.325 kPa and temperature 293 K (time-dependent volume 201). 
The main results of the steady state analysis are listed below: 
• The designed relief capacity of 7 kg/s of pure steam at 0.6 MPa in the 
containment is reached (Figure 4). 
• The average gas velocity in the aerosol filters does not exceed the limit of 0.22 
m/s, while in the zeolite beds of the iodine filter steam velocity is less than 0.5 
m/s (Figure 5). 
• The maximum pressure in the piping system is below 0.65 MPa from 
downstream of aerosol filters to the main orifice and below 0.12 MPa 
downstream of iodine filter inlet orifices (Figure 6). 
• The average temperature of the piping walls is less than 523 K in aerosol 
filters and 493 K in the iodine filter (Figure 7). 
• No condensate accumulates in the piping during steady state downstream of 
the main orifice (Figure 8). 
 
Figure 4. Steam mass flow rate through the PCFV system 
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Figure 5. Gas velocities in aerosol and iodine filters 
 
 
Figure 6. Gas pressures in aerosol and iodine filters 
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Figure 7. Gas temperatures in aerosol and iodine filters 
 
 
Figure 8. Steam void fraction in aerosol and iodine filters 





















AF1               
AF2               
AF3               
AF4               
AF5               
IF                 R5PLOT FER v2.4m
 21:03:24, 16/09/2017























AF1                   
AF2                   
AF3                   
AF4                   
AF5                   
IF                     
R5PLOT FER v2.4m
 18:51:03, 19/09/2017





3.2 Transient calculation 
 
In the absence of measured data, the transient calculation was performed 
with boundary conditions provided by the MELCOR run [3]. The scenario was a 
station blackout with core damage and the release of corium in the containment. 
The molten corium concrete interaction took place in the cavity compartment 
resulting with production of steam and incondesable gases, hydrogen, carbon 
dioxide and carbon monoxide. The majority of stem was released from the primary 
system through the breaks formed at the reactor coolant pumps after degradation of 
pump seals as a consequence of the loss of electrical power. The steam and 
incondesable gases mass flow rates were taken from the MELCOR calculation and 
used as input boundary conditions for this analysis (Figure 9). Initially, the steam 
flow rate was low to account for containment environmental conditions and the 
PCFV system that was filled with air. The steam fraction increased rapidly 
afterwards following the coolant release out of the primary system. 
 
Figure 9. Steam and incondensable gases mass flow rates at the PCFV system inlet 
Discharge of reactor coolant in the containment is responsible for the initial 
containment pressure increase. When the containment dome pressure reaches 0.6 
MPa (the first pressure peak), the rupture disc in the PCFV line will break causing 
containment gases to be released in the environment. The pressure drops fast to 
0.41 MPa prompting the relief valve in the PCFV line to close. Following the valve 
closure, the pressure rises once again. After reaching 0.49 MPa, the relief valve 
opens and again some containment inventory is released. Later, the pressure 
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continues to cycle between 0.41 MPa and 0.49 MPa by the operation of the PCFV 
pressure relief valve, Figure 10 (MELCOR result is shown in the same figure for the 
easier comparison). That kind of valve behaviour is important for preserving 
containment integrity and minimizing radioactive releases. 
 
Figure 10. Containment upper plenum pressure 
The big concern is the possibility of hydrogen ignition in the system 
components during the venting phase. There are two mechanisms of hydrogen 
production: 
• Oxidation of zirconium fuel cladding alloy with steam at temperatures above 
1200 K. Zirconium is transformed into zirconium dioxide in form of a ceramic 
oxide shell on the fuel rods, while hydrogen is released as another product of 
that reaction. 
• Molten corium concrete interaction during which steam released from the 
concrete reacts with steel reinforcement iron. Here, iron oxide and hydrogen 
are the reaction products. 
Hydrogen flammability depends on composition of air-steam-hydrogen 
mixture. The minimum mole fraction of hydrogen that could lead to its ignition is 4-
5 % [9]. The maximum fraction calculated by the RELAP5 was less than 3% (Figure 
11) and, thus, no ignition could take place. The figure indicates the rise in hydrogen 
concentration in the late venting phase but that is irrelevant since no more oxygen 
is released from the containment and, due to the high back-pressure, no oxygen 
could also enter in the system from the outside. The oxygen in the containment was 
consumed earlier by the operation of the hydrogen autocatalytic recombiners which 



































induce the reaction between oxygen and hydrogen until all oxygen has reacted. An 
integral analysis of the whole NEK containment was performed with three system 
codes: ASTEC, MELCOR and MAAP with emphasis on the containment thermal 
hydraulic behaviour when the PCFV system is in the operation [5]. Figure 12 shows 
the gas mixture composition throughout the transient and it is visible that 
conditions for possible hydrogen ignitions were not achieved in any time period 




Figure 11. Hydrogen concentration in aerosol and iodine filters 
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Figure 12. Containment conditions as calculated by 3 codes represented in ternary 




A detailed explicit model of the NPP Krško PCFV system was developed for 
the best-estimate thermal hydraulic code RELAP5. The best-practice code options in 
constructing the nodalization were adopted. The model was tested on the steady 
state and transient levels. 
The steady state calculation was performed to verify the model by comparing 
the results with the system design parameters: gas mass flow rates and velocities, 
system pressure and heat structure temperatures. Pressure loss coefficients and 
hydraulic diameters for equipment with complex geometry, such as aerosol and 
iodine filters, were fine-tuned to obtain satisfactory steady state behaviour. The gas 
composition and boundary conditions were prepared to be in accordance with the 
plant documentation. 
Transient calculation scenario was a station blackout with the complete loss 
of the electrical power. The simulation was used to check the system behaviour in 
accidental conditions, primarily the relief valve operation in keeping the pressure 




































a similar calculation conducted with the code MELCOR because this was the only 
relevant plant analysis with the PCFV system in operation. They showed similar 
trends in pressure evolution during several relief valve opening/closing cycles. The 
conclusion is that the RELAP5 model is qualified for safety analyses of both the 
steady state and transient scenarios. The last thing checked was the hydrogen 
concentration in the different parts of the system. The gas mixture was always 
below the hydrogen flammability limit and no fire danger, or explosion, exists when 
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